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systematic reviews and health technology assessments, include using specified ranges of magnitude of effect, for example, ranges of what
we might consider no effect, trivial, small, moderate, or large effects.
Conclusion: It is desirable for systematic review authors, guideline panelists, and health technology assessors to specify the threshold
or ranges they are using when rating the certainty in evidence.  2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access
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The grading of recommendations assessment, develop-
ment and evaluation (GRADE) Working Group has
designed a widely adopted structure for the development of
clinical practice and public health guidelines [1]. Formally
assessing the trustworthiness of the available evidence repre-
sents a key component of the GRADE approach. GRADE
offered a formal definition of certainty of evidence: ‘‘the
extent of our confidence that the estimates of the effect are
correct or are adequate to support a particular decision or
recommendation’’ (Box 1) [1]. This definition suggests we
are rating confidence or certainty in point estimates of effect.
GRADE did not, however, present a coherent conceptual
basis for rating certainty in such estimates.
The aim of this article is to present an alternative, and
we believe more satisfactory, conceptualization. This alter-
native is grounded in the realization that, when deciding
whether evidence regarding intervention effects is
adequate to support a recommendation, we are not assess-
ing our confidence in point estimates of effects, but rather
our confidence in where effects lie relative to particular
thresholds [2].
In the first part of our discussion, we make evident that
thresholds depend on the health care context and therefore
can vary. In the second part of our discussion, we examine
how authors can formally set thresholds, or ranges of ef-
fects, in certainty of evidence assessments in systematic re-
views. This fundamental point, and the associated
approaches we suggest in this document, now constitute
official GRADE guidance.Box 1 GRADE’s adopted definition of certainty of
the evidence [1]. Note that ‘‘quality of
evidence’’ refers to the same concept as
‘‘certainty of evidence’’ (see paragraph on
definitions).
In the context of a systematic review, the ratings of
the quality of evidence reflect the extent of our con-
fidence that the estimates of the effect are correct.
In the context of making recommendations, the qual-
ity ratings reflect the extent of our confidence that the
estimates of an effect are adequate to support a partic-
ular decision or recommendation.With regard to the necessity for thresholds and the pos-
sibility they may vary, consider a societal choice to invest
in the platelet inhibitor ticagrelor for patients after myocar-
dial infarction. In a hundred typical patients, the drug may
prevent one death over the course of a year, with limited
adverse effects. In high-income countries, the threshold
for implementing ticagrelor may be less than a 1% mortal-
ity reduction, and policy makers may decide on wide-
spread implementation. In this context, we may have
high certainty that the benefit exceeds our threshold for
supporting the recommendation. In low-income countries,
the opportunity cost of offering ticagrelor is likely to be
prohibitive, and the threshold for implementation may be
much higher (a 10% mortality reduction, or perhaps even
larger). In this context, we may have low certainty that
the benefit exceeds our threshold for supporting the
recommendation and may even have high certainty that
the benefit fails to exceed a threshold for supporting
the recommendation and could warrant supporting a
recommendation against.
Thus, given the same evidence regarding a particular
outcome, in the context of a guideline, the certainty of
the evidence can vary depending on the context, and the
health care question being asked. This is often surprising
to those who first encounter the concept. Therefore, in the
first part of the discussion in the following, we will present
another example illustrating this crucial concept.1.1. Definitions
GRADE initially referred to ‘‘quality of evidence’’;
subsequently ‘‘confidence in the estimates’’ replaced ‘‘quality
of evidence’’; most recently ‘‘certainty of evidence’’ has
often become the preferred term. These words all refer to
the same concept, and we will use ‘‘certainty of evidence’’
throughout this article.
As discussed previously, certainty of evidence defined as
adequacy to support a particular decision or recommenda-
tion varies with the health care context. We will refer to
situations where the full health care question/context is
made clear as ‘‘fully contextualized.’’ Such fully contextu-
alized ratings are typically made in the setting of clinical
practice guidelines. We will discuss the distinctions
between assessments made that are fully contextualized,
partly contextualized, and noncontextualizeddthe latter
two typically made in context of systematic reviews and
linical Epidemiology 87 (2017) 4e13What is new?
Key findings
 The grading of recommendations assessment,
development and evaluation (GRADE) Working
Group clarifies that when rating certainty of the ev-
idence for an individual outcome, we are rating
how certain we are that the true effect lies within
a particular range or on one side of a threshold.
 We illustrate approaches for setting thresholds or
ranges with different degrees of contextualization
that can be used for a systematic review, health
technology assessment, or guideline.
What this adds to what was known?
 GRADE’s published definition of certainty of evi-
dence leaves some ambiguity: does it refer to con-
fidence in point estimates, or confidence in a
particular range in which the true effect may lie?
Our presentation provides a clear and coherent
answer to this question.
What is the implication and what should change
now?
 It is desirable for systematic review authors, guide-
line panelists, and health technology assessors to
specify the threshold or ranges they are using to
rate their certainty of the evidence for an individual
outcome. When choosing an approach for setting
threshold or range, the authors should consider
the setting and what would be of most use for
the target audience.
health technology assessments. Fully contextualized ratings
include the possibility that some of the outcomes that are to
be assessed may be societal or economic and may include
issues of feasibility or equity [3].
6 M. Hultcrantz et al. / Journal of CFig. 1. Rating certainty that the true effect lies in a particular range:
an illustration from previous GRADE writings [2].2. Rating certainty: the concept
2.1. We are not rating certainty in point estimates, but
rather certainty that the true effect lies in a particular
range: an illustration from previous GRADE writings
An illustration of rating our certainty that the effect lies
above a particular threshold in GRADE is in the 6th article
of the JCE series that deals with imprecision [2]. In that
article, we present a hypothetical systematic review of
randomized control trials of an intervention to prevent
major strokes that yields a pooled estimate of absolute
reduction in strokes of 1.3%, with a 95% confidence
interval (CI) of 0.6e2.0% (Fig. 1).If there are no serious concerns about risk of bias,
inconsistency, indirectness, or publication bias, the CI will
represent a reasonable estimate of a certainty range, the
range of reasonably believable effects of the intervention;
if there were such concerns, the certainty range (i.e., the
range in which we anticipate the true effect may lie, after
considering not only precision but risk of bias, inconsis-
tency, indirectness, and publication bias) would be wider
and/or shifted compared to the 95% CI, although its exact
distribution would be difficult to ascertain [4].
This thought exercise occurs in the setting of a fully
contextualized evidence certainty rating (typically, a
guideline setting). We ask readers to first assume that the
intervention is a drug with no serious adverse effects,
minimal inconvenience, and modest cost that is equitable,
feasible, and acceptable to administer. Under these circum-
stances, even a small beneficial health effect would warrant
a recommendation for the intervention because, overall, the
desirable consequences would outweigh the undesirable
consequences. For instance, given the considerations about
all the possible downsides or harms, we may recommend
the intervention if it reduced the incidence of stroke by as
little as 0.5% (vertical green line in Fig. 1). Here, we set
a threshold, 0.5%, that defines our willingness to recom-
mend the intervention.
The entireCI (0.6e2.0%)around the effect on stroke reduc-
tion lies to the left of the clinical decision threshold of 0.5%
and therefore excludes a benefit smaller than the threshold.
We candas we point out in the articledtherefore conclude
that the precision of the estimate is sufficient to support a
recommendation: we are confident that the true effect lies
above our threshold and there is no reason to rate down
certainty as a result of imprecision. Assuming there are no
serious concerns with risk of bias, inconsistency, indirectness,
or publication bias, our certainty that the true effect lies above
our thresholdwill be high, and any ensuing recommendation is
likely to be strong.
Consider now a modification of this hypothetical scenario
in which the same treatment is associated with more serious
7M. Hultcrantz et al. / Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 87 (2017) 4e13harm, such as a 0.5% absolute increase in myocardial infarc-
tion. Under these circumstances, we may be reluctant to
recommend treatment unless the absolute stroke reduction
was larger, for instance at least 1% (red line in Fig. 1).
Because the point estimate of 1.3% meets the threshold cri-
terion, a recommendation in favor of treatment would still be
appropriate, but the imprecision-generated uncertainty will
result in only moderate certainty that the effect is above
the threshold. Not only does it lead to lowering our certainty
in the evidence, in this situation we are also likely to make a
weak recommendation.
In this example, the certainty in effect size for the effect
of stroke reduction does not change, but as our threshold for
treatment changes (as the magnitude of undesirable health
effects increases), the certainty that desirable consequences
outweigh undesirable consequences decreases.
The logic of the previous example applies to all fully
contextualized graded recommendations: given the unde-
sirable consequences of an intervention, how certain are
we that the health benefits lie above a threshold that makes
it worthwhile to administer that intervention? Consider
patients with atrial fibrillation who are deciding whether
to use anticoagulant therapy to lower their risk for stroke.
Such patients must weigh the anticipated stroke reduction
against the undesirable health effects of anticoagulation,
including the risk of bleeding. Thus, patients must ask
themselves: how small a stroke reduction am I ready to
accept given the bleeding risk associated with anticoagula-
tion, and still use the drug? Depending on the bleeding
risk, and patients’ values, the answer may be an absolute
reduction in stroke risk of 1%, 2%, 3%, or more. Further-
more, patients need to consider other undesirable health
effects and consequences of anticoagulation: the burden
of medication use, including lifestyle limitations and, if
using warfarin, the need for monitoring.
Note, the question patients are asking relates not to the
point estimate but rather to the possible range in which
the true effect lies. For instance, let us say a patient has
chosen a threshold of 2%. For the decision to use or not
use anticoagulation, it is immaterial whether the true effect
is a 2.1% reduction in stroke or a 3% or larger reduction, as
long as it is more than the 2% threshold. Thus, we should
ascertain our certainty that the true reduction is 2%, not
our certainty that the point estimate represents the true
effect. Although the point estimate might be above the rele-
vant threshold, if the CI crosses the threshold, we would be
less certain that the true effect is above the threshold (and
thus rate down for imprecision).
We have framed the example as the magnitude of benefit
required. It could as easily be framed as the acceptable
magnitude of undesirable consequences [5]. For instance,
given a particular reduction in stroke, how great could the
magnitude of increased bleeding be before patients would
choose to forego anticoagulants.
We have discussed this logic in the context of individ-
ual patient decision making. The process is, however,identical for a guideline panel. The panel members must
ask themselves the extent to which they are certain that
the desirable and undesirable consequences lie in a range
that would clearly mandate a recommendation for or
against a particular management strategy. They are not
thereforedas one might infer from the definition of
certainty in Box 1drating their certainty in the point
estimates of effect.
2.2. Considering uncertainty in both benefits and harms
presents serious challenges to setting thresholds
To this point, we have focused on uncertainty in the
benefits and not uncertainty in the harms. Simultaneously
considering uncertainty in both benefits and harms raises
additional challenges. Moreover, and perhaps even more
challenging, we have focused on a single benefit outcome.
What if, as is often the case, we have more than one benefit
and more than one harm outcome associated with the
intervention? The cognitive challenge of simultaneously
considering quantitative thresholds when there are multiple
desirable and undesirable outcomes is formidabledindeed,
possibly beyond the capacities for all but a very few
individuals. This is analogous to considering our certainty
in total net benefit, as might be generated by a decision
analysis model. The challenges do not, however, bear on
the essential point that when we rate certainty in evidence,
the process has to do with our certainty that true effects lie
in a particular range or on one side of a particular threshold.3. Rating certainty: the options
3.1. Implementing the range/threshold approach to
rating certainty of evidencedcontextualization
The atrial fibrillation example we have used represents a
real (albeit simplified) clinical decision with the simulta-
neous consideration of all critical desirable and undesirable
consequences of treatment. Setting the threshold for use of
anticoagulants, and thus the rating of certainty, requires a
judgment regarding the relative desirability of avoiding
stroke, bleeding, and the burden associated with anticoagu-
lation. We refer to patients’ judgments of relative
desirability as value and preference judgments. A guideline
panel will consider typical values and preferences for the
patient group of interest.
In a clinical context, all outcomes associated with a
given decision and the associated value and preference
judgments are considered simultaneously, and so, a deci-
sion about the tradeoff is ‘‘fully contextualized.’’ Clinical
practice guideline panels should always be considering
such fully contextualized settings, as may systematic
reviews that are undertaken specifically to inform a
guideline panel (Table 1).
For both health technology assessments and system-
atic reviews, there is often a certain degree of
Table 1. Possible ways of setting thresholds or ranges and what the certainty expressed will represent
Setting
Degree of
contextualization Threshold or range How it is set
What the certainty rating
represents
Primarily for systematic
reviews and health
technology assessment
Noncontextualized See Appendix 1 at www.jclinepi.com
for possible approaches
Primarily for systematic
reviews and health
technology assessment
Partially contextualized Specified magnitude of
effect
For example, a small effect
can be defined as an
effect small enough that
one might consider not
using the intervention if
adverse effects or costs
are appreciable
Certainty in a specified
magnitude of effect for
one outcome (e.g., no or
trivial, small, moderate or
large effect)
Primarily for clinical
practice guidelines
Fully contextualized Threshold determined with
considerations of all
critical outcomes
Considering the range of
possible effects on all
critical outcomes,
bearing in mind the
decision(s) that need to
be made, and the
associated values and
preferences
For each outcome, ratings
represent our confidence
that the direction of the
net effect (positive or
negative) will not differ
from one end of the
certainty range to the
other.
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outcomes presented, the consideration of indirectness,
and some notion of how the target audience values the
outcomes). Thus, systematic review and health technol-
ogy assessment authors should be explicit about the
context they have in mind, and whether or not issues of
feasibility and equity are influencing their judgments
(usually, they will not). The specification of a complete
set of values and preferences that allow the tradeoff be-
tween desirable and undesirable outcomes is not, howev-
er, in the authors’ purview. Their consideration of
certainty in evidence is not, therefore, fully
contextualized.
GRADE writings have recognized this key distinction
between practice guidelines and systematic reviews
and therefore offered two definitions of certainty in evi-
dence, one for the former setting and one for the latter
(Box 1) [1]. The process for setting thresholds for
fully contextualized ratings of certainty may sometimes
be challenging, but the need is clear. The process
for setting thresholds for settings that are not fully
contextualized is less clear. We will now address this
issue.3.2. Noncontextualized or partly contextualized ratings
of certainty
Table 1 presents, in addition to the fully contextualized
rating of certainty, reference to noncontextualized
approaches that appear in an appendix and description
of a partly contextualized approach. The noncontextual-
ized and partly contextualized approaches are relevant
primarily for systematic reviews and health technology
assessments.The two noncontextualized approachesdof potential use
primarily in systematic reviews and health technology
assessmentsddo not represent guidance for applying
GRADE but are part of a complete conceptualization of
the certainty of evidence. One of these noncontextualized
approaches presents certainty that the true effect lies within
the 95% CI. A second approach focuses on our certainty that
a nonnull effect is present. We include further details of these
two approaches only in Appendix 1 at www.jclinepi.com.
We will illustrate the application of the approaches us-
ing the example of the decision regarding whether to use
shorter or longer duration of dual antiplatelet therapy
(DAPT), that is, aspirin and clopidogrel, or a related drug,
in patients with coronary artery disease who have under-
gone placement of drug-eluting stents in their coronary ar-
teries [6]. Critical outcomes in this case include death,
myocardial infarction, serious bleeding, and stroke.
Table 2 presents an evidence summary of the impact of
longer duration vs. shorter duration DAPT on these four
outcomes.3.2.1. Partly contextualized ratings of certainty (typically
used in systematic reviews and health technology assess-
ments): ranges of magnitude of effect
A partly contextualized option is to rate our certainty in
a specific magnitude of effect (Table 1). For instance, we
could consider whether the point estimate for a single
outcome, were it accurate, represents a trivial, small, mod-
erate, or large effect. We could then rate our certainty that
the true effect for this outcome, expressed in absolute
terms, lies within the boundaries of whatever we consider
the range of a trivial, small, medium or large effect. This
is completely analogous with our prior discussion of thresh-
olds, but now we have two: one that represents the upper,
and one the lower, limit of the designations small, medium,
Table 2. Longer duration vs. shorter duration DAPT after drug-eluting stents: partial evidence profilea
Outcome
No. of
participants
(no. of studies) Risk of bias Inconsistency Indirectness
Publication
bias
Relative
risk
(95% CI)
Absolute effect
per 1,000 treated
(95% CI) per year
Total
mortality
28,088 (9) No serious
limitations
No serious
inconsistency
No serious
indirectness
Undetected 1.19 (1.04e1.36) 2 more (0 more to 4 more)
Myocardial
infarction
28,088 (9) No serious
limitations
Serious
inconsistency
No serious
indirectness
Undetected 0.73 (0.58e0.92) 8 fewer (12 to 2 fewer)
Serious
bleeding
26,475 (8) No serious
limitations
No serious
inconsistency
No serious
indirectness
Undetected 1.63 (1.34e1.99) 6 more (3 more to 10 more)
Stroke 28,088 (9) No serious
limitations
No serious
inconsistency
No serious
indirectness
Undetected 0.99 (0.71e1.37) 0 more (2 fewer to 2 more)
Abbreviations: CI, confidence interval; DAPT, dual antiplatelet therapy.
a The fifth domain, imprecision, is not presented in this table because the assessment of imprecision is dependent on the chosen threshold or
range (Table 1).
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for health technology assessments, or for systematic
reviewers who believe the usefulness of their review will
be enhanced by providing ‘‘plain language’’ to specify
the magnitude of effect.
The challenge here is the specification of what we will
consider trivial, small, moderate, and large effects. This is
likely to differ across outcomes. People may, for example,
consider a reduction in deaths of 6 in 100 patients (e.g.,
from 20% to 14%) per yeardor even lessda large effect.
People are less likely to consider the same magnitude of
effect as large if the outcome is much less serious (for
instance, recurrent migraine headache). Ideally, in the
future, consensus approaches could achieve a consensus
regarding thresholds for trivial, small, moderate, or large
effects for a wide variety of outcomes.
To be optimally clear, the characterization of the size of
effect would also require specification of the consequences
against which the effect on the chosen outcome is being
traded off. For example, one could specify that there are
no harms, and a small effect would then be one large
enough that, given the burden of administration, one would
consider it worthwhile to use the intervention. For most
interventions (e.g., taking one pill a day), this would be
very small and would represent the minimum of the range
of a small effect. One would also require a way of speci-
fying the upper range of what one considers a small effect,
a challenge that remains in applying the approach.
Such thresholds would only apply to absolute effects
(a relative risk reduction of 50% could mean a reduction from
2% to 1%, likely a small effect, or 40% to 20%, likely a large
effect). If one used this approach in our example, one might
specify that the effect of longer duration DAPT on mortality
was a small effect (2 in 1,000) and that we have high certainty
that it is small (the upper boundary of the CI is 4 in 1,000, and
there is no other reason to rate down certainty).
Considering myocardial infarction, one might specify
that the point estimate represents an effect that is small
(a reduction of 8 in 1,000) but we have only low certainty
that the effect is indeed small Table 3. The rationale for thisjudgment would be as follows. The CI includes 2 in 1,000
fewer, an effect that many might consider trivial, and 12 in
1,000 fewer, an effect that (arguably) many might consider
moderate. In addition, however, we found serious inconsis-
tency in results (point estimates of relative effect ranged
from 0.49 to 1.08, I2 36%), and this raises the possibility
that the effect might either be trivial or no effect at all, or
might be moderate. One could apply similar logic to
bleeding and stroke outcomes.
When the CI of effect estimate overlaps the null effect,
as in this case for the outcome of stroke (i.e., relative asso-
ciation measure of 1 or absolute association measure of 0),
two conclusions are possible: (1) the evidence is imprecise
(e.g., small number of events) and we are unable to reliably
answer the question of effectiveness or (2), the evidence is
precise and the intervention is in fact not effective, or the
effect is trivial. To make the latter inference (no or trivial
effect), the CI needs to be sufficiently narrow to exclude
the threshold of whatever one considers the lower boundary
of a small effect. If the CI is tight and does not cross this
threshold, one can infer that the effect is null or trivial
(and presumably, the intervention, with respect to that
effect, is not worth considering). If the CI is wider and is
not contained within this threshold, the conclusion would
be that the evidence is imprecise and cannot reliably
exclude a small (or if very wide moderate or even large)
effect.
In this context, the question is how certain are we that
the effect lies in a particular range, with boundaries on
either side of an RR of 1.0? For stroke in our example, if
one set boundaries at 0.70 and 1.38, certainty would be
high. If one set narrower boundaries, one would rate down
for imprecision. In terms of absolute effects, with a CI of 2
fewer to 2 more strokes, one would likely conclude there is
a precise estimate of a trivial or null absolute effect.
Making a judgment that an intervention effect is no greater
than trivial will, just as for the other ranges, require some
degree of contextualizationdfor instance, the more impor-
tant the outcome, the narrower the range in which one will
be willing to conclude that there is no important effect.
Table 3. Possible certainty ratings for myocardial infarction (MI) for longer duration vs. shorter duration DAPT
Approaches Examples of set thresholds or ranges Certainty
Specified magnitude: small effect The effect is small over a range of 4e11
fewer MIs per 1,000
We have low certainty that longer duration
DAPT gives a small decrease in the
incidence of MI compared with shorter
duration DAPT (rating down for
inconsistency and imprecision).
Threshold determined with considerations of
all critical outcomes
Threshold based on the value we place on MI,
bleeding, stroke, and death
Overall, considering typical values and
preferences (equal weight to MI and
serious bleeding, high importance to
mortality, aversion to taking medication
with minimal net benefit), we have low
certainty that longer duration DAPT does
not decrease MI sufficiently to outweigh
the effects on survival, bleeding, and the
burden associated with long-term use of
additional medication.
We have low certainty in the MI outcome
because the overall balance between net
benefit and net harm differs across the
certainty range for MI (rating down for
inconsistency and imprecision).
Abbreviation: DAPT, dual antiplatelet therapy.
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used in clinical practice guidelines) to individual
outcomes
When, typically in the setting of a guideline or recom-
mendation, we make fully contextualized ratings, we are
simultaneously weighing the benefits and harms of every
important outcome. Such contextualized ratings may best
be addressed at the stage of the evidence to decision, rather
than at an earlier point in the decision-making process (i.e.,
the evidence profile or summary of findings stage). At
whatever stage, a guideline panel decides to make the
assessment, having separate certainty ratings for each
outcome in the fully contextualized setting can inform
patients, clinicians, and researchers as to where there are
important gaps in medical knowledge.
The fully contextualized ratings of individual outcomes
do not altogether resolve the issue of how best to rate the
certainty in the net benefit. Indeed, alternative approaches
to addressing certainty of evidence in the fully contextual-
ized setting, and in particular an overall rating of certainty
in net benefit, are issues of ongoing GRADE Working
Group activity.
When simultaneously considering all outcomes, howev-
er, the lowest rating of certainty among the critical out-
comes will generally provide an upper limit for the
overall certainty in the balance between desirable and unde-
sirable health outcomes (i.e., the net benefit). This is what
GRADE currently refers to as the overall certainty of
evidence [7] and thusdpending further conceptual
developmentdit provides an interim approximation of cer-
tainty in the net benefit. Once an approach is developed for
assessing certainty in the net benefit, fully contextualized
ratings for individual outcomes may no longer be needed.One approach to a fully contextualized rating of net
benefit would be using a decision model, in which sensi-
tivity analyses would highlight which outcomes are capable
of tipping the model (altering the overall result from benefit
to harm or vice versa) over a range of plausible values for
those outcomes. The approach to fully contextualized
ratings we are suggesting in this article is analogous to
the decision model approach. The approach involves differ-
ential weighting of the importance of outcomes and allows
a guideline panel to, without creating a decision model,
address net benefit.
Making fully contextualized ratings of certaintydand
indeed, deciding if one recommends for or against an
interventiondrequires first specifying values. The values
should be those of the patients, and GRADE [8] and others
provide guidance regarding how to obtain estimates of
those values. The process includes a systematic review of
the relevant literature [9], the experience of the topic
experts in conducting shared decision making, consultation
with patients and patient groups, and conduct of targeted
surveys [10e12].
In the DAPT example, a guideline panel might note that
they believe that typical patients would value a myocardial
infarction and serious bleed similarly, place an appreciably
greater value on stroke (say, three times the value of a bleed
or myocardial infarction) and an even greater value on
death (say, five times the value of a bleed or myocardial
infarction).
Before considering uncertainty, the initial judgment
regarding a recommendation would be its direction. That
judgment can initially be based on the point estimates of
effects and the associated values and preferences. On
occasion, the point estimates may suggest a direction of
recommendation, but after full consideration of the certainty
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the opposite direction. Nevertheless, focusing on the point
estimates provides a useful starting point. In this case, using
the weights we have specified previously, the reduction in
MI of 8 in 1,000 over 1 year suggests a recommendation
in favor of longer duration DAPT, but the increase in
bleeding of 6 and in death of 2 more than balances the
benefit. Thus, the recommendation would be against the
use of longer duration DAPT.
Having decided on the direction, let us consider the cer-
tainty rating, beginning with the outcome of death.
Because, for mortality, there are no serious limitations in
risk of bias, consistency, directness, or publication bias,
the certainty (high or moderate) depends on the judgment
of precision. One might start the process of rating precision
by looking at the point estimates of outcomes other than the
one under consideration (in this case, outcomes other than
death). Considering the values and preferences mentioned
previously (equal value on MI and bleeding) and ignoring
mortality, if longer duration DAPT reduced myocardial
infarctions by 8 in 1,000, increased bleeds by 6 in 1,000,
and did not change the incidence of stroke, we would
recommend in favor of longer duration DAPT (though
barely, it would be a close call).
Now, what if longer duration DAPT actually had no
effect on mortality (a risk difference of 0, at one boundary
of the CI)? We would continue to recommend longer dura-
tion DAPT. What about the other end of the CI, an increase
in 4 deaths. Were this the case, we would surely recom-
mend against longer duration DAPT. Thus, because the de-
cision differs at the opposite ends of the CI, we rate down
our certainty for imprecision.
Note, making this judgment did not require the likely
painful obligation of specifying the exact mortality
threshold between recommending for or against. All we
needed to know is that our decision differed at either end
of the CI, and therefore, the threshold must lie somewhere
within the CI, in this case between 0 and 4 deaths.
Let us now consider MI. Because we have already iden-
tified problems in inconsistency, the rating of certainty may
begin as moderate, and we will examine whether to rate
down for imprecision. Putting MI, the outcome under
consideration, aside, and looking at the point estimates of
the other three outcomes, would we recommend longer
duration DAPT? Given the increase in death of 2, and an
increase in bleeding of 6, surely not.
Would the possible effect on MI change this recommen-
dation? The minimum reduction in MI (two events) would
clearly not change the recommendation, but what about the
maximum (12 events)? Given the value of death (5 that of
MI, so two increased deaths would have a weight of 10) and
the point estimate of bleeding increase (6 events), the net
disutility of death and bleeding is greater than the utility
advantage of reducing MI even by 12/1,000 per year.
Therefore, considering only point estimates, even the
largest plausible reduction in MI is less than would berequired to compensate for death and bleeding, and consid-
ering point estimates alone, we do not need to rate down for
imprecision.
One should, however, also consider the uncertainty in
estimates of effects on the other three outcomes. Could
one imagine a constellation of possible effects of longer
duration DAPT on outcomes other than MI that would lead
one to recommend longer duration DAPT if the true effect
on MI were a reduction in 12? Certainly, if there were an
increase in death of only 1/1,000 rather than 2 (very plau-
sible as a potential truth), the utility of the reduction of
12 MIs would be greater than the disutility associated with
death and serious bleeding. Thus, given the uncertainty
across outcomes, it is possible that the reduction in MI
warrants use of longer duration DAPT and we should rate
down for imprecision Table 3.
Note again that the process did not require an exact
specification of a threshold. The requirement was only
to decide whether the decision changes depending on
the extremes of the CI. If it does not, then the entire CI
is on one side of the threshold (as it was when we consid-
ered only point estimates) in which case we needn’t rate
down our certainty. Alternatively, the threshold may be
within the CI boundaries (as it was when we considered
uncertainty in non-MI outcomes) therefore requiring
rating down for imprecision. Our experience suggests that
these decisions will be easier than attempting to define an
exact threshold.3.4. The consideration of optimal information size
Previous GRADE writings have suggested using the
optimal information size (OIS) as a possible primary item
for rating imprecision [2] (i.e., considering whether the to-
tal number of participants in the included trials is more than
the number of patients generated by a conventional sample
size calculation for a single adequately powered trial). This
way of rating imprecision is not compatible with the
approaches described in the present article. However,
whichever of our suggested approaches reviewers are using,
they will sometimes confront large effect sizes with appar-
ently satisfactory CIs despite modest sample size. Because
such findings are untrustworthydexperience has shown
that these large effects typically decrease or disappear as
data accumulatedthey require consideration of the event
rate using OIS or closely related alternative approaches [4].3.5. Presentation of certainty of evidence in the context
of clinical practice guidelines
Both fully and less or noncontextualized ratings repre-
sent, in the guideline context, options for presenting
certainty (in, for instance, evidence to decision tables). An
advantage of choosing less-contextualized ratings is that
such a presentation may be more useful for another group
that wishes to adapt the guideline to a different context
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typical values). Doing so, however, admits that this prelim-
inary certainty rating often will differ from the fully contex-
tualized rating that the panel must use in deciding on the
direction and strength of their recommendation.
Indeed, the advantage of choosing the fully contextual-
ized approach is that the simultaneous consideration of
all outcomes, and the implications for certainty of evidence,
determines the ultimate direction and strength of recom-
mendations. High or moderate certainty with a large
gradient between desirable and undesirable outcomes will
dictate a strong recommendation. Low certainty, or a small
gradient between desirable and undesirable outcomes, will
generally dictate a weak recommendation.
In making the decision regarding whether to present
less-contextualized or noncontextualized ratings of evi-
dence along with certainty ratings that drive the direction
and strength of their recommendations, guideline panels
may want to consider both what is optimal for the process
of coming to the recommendation, and what will be most
helpful for the ultimate consumers of the guideline. They
should specify, clearly and explicitly, which approach to
setting thresholds for effect they used.3.6. Some limitations in the discussion
Bayesian thinking, and formal Bayesian statistics, would
provide an alternative approach to the questions we have
addressed in this article. This would be interesting to
pursue but is beyond the scope of the current discussion
because, currently, guideline developers seldom use the
approach.
Formal decision analysis based on expected utility the-
ory provides a structure for the simultaneous consideration
of multiple outcomes, including uncertainty in estimates.
Methodologists have suggested alternative quantitative
approaches to decision making that rely on explicit
specification of values and preferences [13,14]. Decision
analysis, as well as alternative quantitative approaches,
could therefore be a potential solution to the challenges
we raise in our discussion of the fully contextualized rating.
Clinical practice guidelines seldom, however, involve
formal decision analysis. Decision analysis has had even
less impact on individual patient decision making, and new-
er quantitative methods have not yet stood the test of time.
Ultimately, such approaches may provide an alternative
framework for the simultaneous consideration of all
outcomes.4. Conclusions
This article has addressed the following question: whenwe
rate certainty of evidence, what exactly is it in which we are
rating our certainty. The answer we have provided is that weare rating our certainty that the true effect lies on one side of
a particular threshold, or in a particular range. What follows
from this is the desirability for systematic review authors,
guideline panelists, and health technology assessors to specify
the threshold or ranges they are using.We have presented how
this might be done in the fully contextualized setting and pre-
sented alternatives for less-contextualized settings. Future
research can assess which approaches are most useful for
different settings and target groups, aswell as howbest authors
can communicate the threshold or ranges they are using.
Finally, although all our examples relate to intervention ef-
fects, the guidance that ratings of certainty should specify
the relevant thresholds underlying the judgments also applies
to questions of diagnosis and prognosis.Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank colleagues at the
Swedish Agency for Health Technology Assessment and
Assessment of Social Services (SBU) who, through partici-
pating in a series of seminars, contributed with valuable
input on the initial draft of the presented approaches. The
authors also thank all the GRADE Working Group members
who have contributed to the article during group discussions
at Grade Working Group meetings.Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclinepi.2017.05.006.
References
[1] Balshem H, Helfand M, Schunemann HJ, Oxman AD, Kunz R,
Brozek J, et al. GRADE guidelines: 3. Rating the quality of evidence.
J Clin Epidemiol 2011;64:401e6.
[2] Guyatt GH, Oxman AD, Kunz R, Brozek J, Alonso-Coello P,
Rind D, et al. GRADE guidelines 6. Rating the quality of
evidenceeimprecision. J Clin Epidemiol 2011;64:1283e93.
[3] Welch VA, Akl EA, Pottie K, Ansari MT, Briel M, Christensen R,
et al. GRADE Equity Guidelines 3: health equity considerations in
rating the certainty of synthesized evidence. J Clin Epidemiol
2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jclinepi.2017.01.015.
[4] Schunemann HJ. Interpreting GRADE’s levels of certainty or quality
of the evidence: GRADE for statisticians, considering review
information size or less emphasis on imprecision? J Clin Epidemiol
2016;75:6e15.
[5] Schunemann HJ. Guidelines 2.0: do no net harm-the future of
practice guideline development in asthma and other diseases. Curr
Allergy Asthma Rep 2011;11(3):261e8.
[6] Spencer FA, Prasad M, Vandvik PO, Chetan D, Zhou Q, Guyatt G.
Longer- versus shorter-duration dual-antiplatelet therapy after drug-
eluting stent placement: a systematic review and meta-analysis.
Ann Intern Med 2015;163:118e26.
[7] Guyatt G,OxmanAD, Sultan S, Brozek J, Glasziou P,Alonso-Coello P,
et al. GRADEguidelines: 11.Making an overall rating of confidence in
effect estimates for a single outcome and for all outcomes. J Clin
Epidemiol 2013;66:151e7.
13M. Hultcrantz et al. / Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 87 (2017) 4e13[8] Andrews JC, Schunemann HJ, Oxman AD, Pottie K, Meerpohl JJ,
Coello PA, et al. GRADE guidelines: 15. Going from evidence to
recommendation-determinants of a recommendation’s direction and
strength. J Clin Epidemiol 2013;66:726e35.
[9] MacLean S, Mulla S, Akl EA, Jankowski M, Vandvik PO, Ebrahim S,
et al. Patient values and preferences in decision making for
antithrombotic therapy: a systematic review: Antithrombotic Therapy
and Prevention of Thrombosis, 9th ed.: American College of Chest
Physicians Evidence-Based Clinical Practice Guidelines. Chest
2012;141:e1Se23S.
[10] Darzi AJ, Officer A, Abualghaib O, Akl EA. Stakeholders’
perceptions of rehabilitation services for individuals living with
disability: a survey study. Health Qual Life Outcomes 2016;14:2.[11] Santesso N, Schunemann H, Blumenthal P, De Vuyst H, Gage J,
Garcia F, et al. World Health Organization Guidelines: use of
cryotherapy for cervical intraepithelial neoplasia. Int J Gynaecol
Obstet 2012;118(2):97e102.
[12] Schunemann HJ, Hill SR, Kakad M, Vist GE, Bellamy R,
Stockman L, et al. Transparent development of the WHO rapid
advice guidelines. PLoS Med 2007;4(5):e119.
[13] Puhan MA, Singh S, Weiss CO, Varadhan R, Boyd CM. A framework
for organizing and selecting quantitative approaches for benefit-harm
assessment. BMC Med Res Methodol 2012;12:173.
[14] Yu T, Fain K, Boyd CM, Singh S, Weiss CO, Li T, et al. Benefits and
harms of roflumilast in moderate to severe COPD. Thorax 2014;
69(7):616e22.
